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Abstract 
This paper develops a small macroeconomic model of the Armenian economy. After 
setting up the model and its estimation, a number of macroeconomic scenarios is 
analyzed in the form of out-of-sample simulations. We analyze the transmissions in 
the model of a number of macroeconomic shocks and policy scenarios to obtain a 
better understanding of their possible effects on the internal and external balance 
of the Armenian economy. A special focus is put on the role of exchange rate and 
monetary management and the inflow of remittances in the Armenian economy. 
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1. Introduction 
Land-locked  Armenia  was  one  of  the  many  USSR  satellites  that  became 
independent  in  1991  after  the  breaking-up  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Experiencing  a 
difficult  transition  during  the  1990s,  it  managed  to  gradually  achieve 
macroeconomic stability and experienced a vigilant rebound of economic growth 
the recent years. Since 2001, growth was around 10% and inflation has been low, 
so that it has been sometimes referred to as a ‘Caucasian Tiger’. 
According  to  the  EBRD  (2006)  evaluation,  Armenia  has  made  relatively  good 
progress in liberalisation and structural reforms compared with other countries in 
the  CIS.  Progress  is  especially  made  in  the  areas  of  privatisation  and  market 
liberalisation  and  also  achievements  in  the  area  of  financial  sector 
liberalisation/regulation and infrastructure reforms, it outperforms the CIS average. 
Improvements  in  the  business  environment  relate  especially  to  tax  reforms, 
simplifying the tax system, and efforts devoted to fight corruption. Also thanks to 
these developments, FDI to Armenia has increased the recent years from its low 
initial levels. 
Aim of this paper is to present a small quarterly macroeconomic  model of the 
Armenian economy, estimate the model for the period 1996-2007, and to work out 
a set of relevant macroeconomic adjustment scenarios for the period 2008-2011 
that  illustrate  the  most  important  macroeconomic  mechanisms  and  policy 
strategies for the Armenian economy. In the analysis we focus in particular on the 
role of exchange rate and monetary management, fiscal policy and the importance 
of remittances to the Armenian economy. In order to do so, the links between 
monetary variables and balance of payments are modelled in detail. 
Our focus on monetary and fiscal policy is related to the recent discussion if and 
how monetary and fiscal policies might need to be tightened in the light of growing 
internal and external imbalances following an economic boom. Our analysis is also 
linked  to  a  number  of  studies  on  macroeconomic  policy  and  determinants  of 
inflation in transition economies. Studies such as Lissovolik (2003), for the case of 
Ukraine, and Vymyatnina (2006), for the case of Russia, present evidence that in 
the  CIS  countries  there  remain  strong  interrelations  between  inflation,  money 
growth, exchange rate changes and wage growth and at the same time they are 
experiencing a process of de-dollarization, financial deepening and remonitization 
(implying e.g. high credit growth, a declining velocity and higher money multiplier). 
Taken  together  this  implies  that  monetary  authorities  in  the  CIS  countries  are 
typically  working  within  a  delicate  balance  of  different  forces  of  power,  where 
policy mistakes may easily unwind adverse inflationary pressures again. Armenia is 
therefore a good example of the challenges the CIS countries faced during recent 
years. 
Our  analysis  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  summarizes  the  main 
macroeconomic trends in Armenia, Section 3 works out a small macroeconomic Macroeconomic Adjustment in Armenia: The Role of External Factors 
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model that we will use to analyze the Armenian economy. Section 4 estimates and 
simulates this model using Armenian data. In Section 5 a number of out-of-sample 
simulations  for  the  period  2008-2010  are  carried  out  to  assess  the  effects  of 
number of alternative scenarios. 
2. Armenia: Macroeconomic Adjustments and Policies 
This  section  provides  an  overview  of  the  main  macroeconomic  developments, 
macroeconomic  policies  and  their  effects  during  the  period  1995-2007.  The 
macroeconomic trends in the Armenian economy clearly need to be placed in a 
broader context of economic transformation, institutional and political reforms and 
increasing openness to regional and global developments. After the initial deep and 
prolonged  transformational  recession  in  the  1990s,  the  Armenian  economy  has 
been  gradually  recovering,  liberalizing  and  transforming  since  2000.1  Table  1 
summarizes the development of the main macroeconomic indicators during this 
period. 
Table 1: Summary of Main Macro-Economic Adjustments, Armenia 1995-2007. 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Real GDP Growth 
(%,yoy) 
6.9%  5.9%  3.3%  7.2%  3.0%  4.6%  10.3%  13.7%  13.8%  9.9%  17.2%  13.3%  12.9% 
CPI Inflation 
(%,yoy) 
176.0%  18.7%  14.0%  8.7%  0.7%  -0.8%  3.2%  1.1%  4.7%  7.0%  0.6%  2.9%  4.4% 
Employment 
Growth (%,yoy) 
-1.0%  -2.7%  -3.8%  -3.1%  -2.5%  -1.5%  -3.5%  -8.2%  -2.9%  -0.6%  -0.2%  -0.2%  -0.6% 
Current Account 
(mln US$) 
-386.6  -475.3  -523.7  -595.4  -481.2  -466.4  -373.5  -321.2  -407.9  -449.5  -575.4  -811.1 -1500.0 
Exchange Rate 
(Dram/US$) 
405.9  414.0  490.9  504.9  535.1  539.5  555.1  573.4  578.8  533.5  457.7  416.0  342.1 
Real Exchange 
Rate (%,yoy) 
  -62.0%  -15.5%  -11.6%  1.7%  5.4%  2.5%  -15.1%  -20.5%  10.7%  -16.0%  -6.2%  -15.2% 
Fiscal Deficit (% 
GDP) 
-6.0%  -4.4%  -2.6%  -3.8%  -4.1%  -4.9%  -4.3%  -2.5%  -0.9%  -1.1%  -1.0%  -0.3%  1.0% 
M0 (%,yoy)  162.2%  35.2%  36.2%  11.7%  -2.5%  17.8%  19.8%  20.5%  22.2%  11.8%  43.1%  37.3%  44.0% 
M2 (%,yoy)  94.6%  36.4%  36.9%  32.5%  20.5%  27.0%  20.9%  12.1%  18.6%  21.2%  28.2%  26.5%  40.6% 
Remittances 
(%GDP) 
16.2%  14.4%  19.3%  12.6%  12.4%  12.6%  11.3%  11.0%  11.1%  15.0%  13.4%  14.2%  13.4% 
Foreign Reserves 
(mln US$) 
38.3  49.8  103.5  148.4  125.8  155.8  157.6  240.3  276.5  309.7  556.6  774.0  1304.2 
Source: IMF, own calculations 
2.1.Economic growth 
Since 2001, the Armenian economy has displayed high growth rates around 10%, 
marking a clear turnaround from the dismal economic performance in the 1990s. 
Increased inflows of remittances and FDI are among the factors contributing to the 
                                                           
1 A detailed analysis of this reform and transition process is beyond the scope of this paper. See e.g. 
EBRD (2006) for a detailed analysis of the transition process in Armenia. Bas van AARLE & Robert SOSOIAN 
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rapid growth. Like several other transition countries, the high growth rates have 
not  been  accompanied  by  high  employment  growth,  in  fact  there  has  been 
essentially  jobless  growth  for  a  decade  in  Armenia,  reflecting  shedding  of  job 
redundancies in the public sector due to privatizations and productivity growth in 
the private sector. A detailed account of the Armenian labour market, institutions 
and reforms is found in a recent Worldbank (2007) study. 
2.2. Monetary and exchange rate policy 
Alongside the economic boom of the recent years and relatively low inflation and 
strong remittances, money growth is very high. The observed decline in velocity, 
unsterilized  interventions,  the  process  of  de-dollarization2  or  ‘dramization’  and 
surging credit growth and capital inflows all contribute to the very high rates of 
money growth in the recent years. The Central Bank of Armenia (CBA) is planning a 
gradual introduction of a full-fledged inflation targeting framework, to reduce the 
volatility in inflation and inflation expectations. On January 1, 2006, the first steps 
in this process were formalised by announcing a 3% CPI inflation target.3 
The exchange rate policy of the Dram can best be characterized as a ‘dirty float’, 
displaying  considerable  swings.  Large  and  volatile  inflows  of  remittances  and 
foreign capital, imply volatility in balance-of-payments, the exchange rate and base 
money growth. In particular the large inflows of remittances tend to appreciate the 
Dram and to increase base money growth as the central bank finds it increasingly 
difficult to sterilize the foreign exchange interventions. 
2.3. Fiscal policy, structural reforms 
Subsidies to compensate the increases in the price of imported natural gas since 
2006 put pressure on the expenditure side. On the revenue side, fiscal reforms are 
starting to yield some effect and the efficiency of tax administration and the tax 
collection to improve. Studies by Davoodi and Grigorian (2007), however, indicate 
that  Armenia’s  tax  system  is  still  very  far  from  efficient.  In  particular  weak 
institutions and a large shadow economy are singled out as the factors behind the 
inefficiencies. 
2.4. External balance 
Armenia  is  a  small  open  economy,  as  witness  exports  (and  imports)  to  GDP 
fluctuating  around  30%.  Exports  and  imports  are  divided  over  CIS  countries 
                                                           
2 A detailed analysis on dollarization in Armenia is provided in Zoryan (2005) which finds that Armenia 
has featured among the former CIS countries with the highest rates of dollarization. The share of foreign 
currency deposits in total deposits rose from 38% in 1992 to over 70% in 2001, declining again from 
then. Remittances are noted as one of the factors behind dollarization in Armenia. 
3 See Dabla-Norris et al. (2006) and (2007) for all details on the introduction of inflation targeting in 
Armenia. Obstacles to a full-fledged IT strategy in Armenia are vulnerability to economic shocks, poor 
coordination  between  fiscal  and  monetary  policy,  underdeveloped  financial  systems,  institutional 
weaknesses, and limited central bank technical capacity. Also the observation that not all traditional 
channels of monetary policy (interest rate channel. Macroeconomic Adjustment in Armenia: The Role of External Factors 
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(roughly one third) and non CIS countries (two thirds). During most recent years, a 
trade deficit in the order of 5 to 10 percent of GDP has been matched by inflows of 
remittances, FDI and financial capital. Remittances are a very important item for 
the Armenian balance-of-payments and the Armenian economy in general. Studies 
by USAID (2004) and IMF  (2006) provides a detailed account of remittances to 
Armenia and their most important effects. Like capital inflows, remittances can 
fluctuate considerably over time and there are some statistical complications in 
measuring remittances as some remittances may remain outside the statistics and 
some transactions may incorrectly be classified as remittances. Notwithstanding 
this uncertainty, most estimates indicate that remittances to Armenia amount to 
around  1  bln  USD  annually,  a  considerable  amount  for  a  small  economy  like 
Armenia (in the order of 10 to 15 percent of GDP). Consumer surveys indicate that 
some 40 percent of households receive remittances from close and more distant 
relatives and that the share of such remittances in total household income range 
typically between 25 and 75 percent. Remittances to Armenia do not only result 
from workers working temporarily or seasonally abroad (in particular in Russia) but 
in particular from a large ‘diaspora’, large foreign communities of Armenian origin 
(in particular Russia, USA and France) that, sometimes over several generations, 
continue to be strongly linked to their homeland. Remittances are in particular 
linked  to  household  consumption  and  to  lesser  extent  private  investment 
opportunities, especially real estate investment. 
2.5. Financial sector 
Reforms in the banking and financial sector have improved efficiency and increased 
financial intermediation. Measures by the CBA against non-cash payments and that 
stimulate  the  use  of  bank  accounts,  aim  at  reducing  the  shadow  economy. 
Competition in the financial sector is increasing by the entrance of foreign banks 
and improved prudential supervision. Full liberalization of capital flows has been 
achieved as well. 
2.6. Institutional aspects, reforms and the shadow economy 
As noted in the introduction Armenia has managed to move the recent years to the 
frontier of the CIS countries in the area of various reforms, even if initial conditions 
were not the most favourable. Interestingly is also a gradual success in reducing the 
shadow economy: starting with a share of the shadow economy of over 90% of the 
official economy in 1996, it has been gradually reduced to less than 30% in 2005 
according to the estimates of Tunyan (2005). It is beyond doubt that these positive 
developments concerning structural reforms and strengthening of institutions and 
governance, including a retreat of the informal economy, have also been providing 
a favourable contribution to macroeconomic stability by ameliorating the economic 
environment in a broader sense, even if it is hard to add concrete numbers to these 
factors. Bas van AARLE & Robert SOSOIAN 
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3. A Model of the Armenian Economy. 
Having  obtained  more  insight  into  the  most  pronounced  developments  in  the 
Armenian economy, this section develops a  small  scale  model of the Armenian 
economy that can be used for (stylized) macroeconomic policy analysis based on 
quarterly data. In particular we want to analyze, the occurrence of macroeconomic 
shocks  and  alternative  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  and  their  consequences 
according to the model. Also the effects of alternative scenarios of remittances is 
analysed, to gain more insight into the sensitivity of the Armenian economy to 
changes in remittances. 
The base of the model that will be estimated in this section consists of a small 
dynamic open economy AD-AS-LM model with price and wage dynamics. There are 
currently  no  similar  macroeconomic  models  of  the  Armenian  economy  to  our 
knowledge.  Table  2  provides  the  structure  of  the  model  which  contains  four 
building blocks: (a) aggregate demand and prices, (b) money, balance of payments, 
interest rates and exchange rates, (c) price, wages and (un)employment, (d) public 
finance. 
Table 2: A Small Model of the Armenian Economy 
(a) aggregate demand   
( ) ( ) 0 1 2 log ( ) log RCON RSIN RYDP = - + a a a   (1) 
( ) ( ) 0 1 2 log ( ) log RINV RSIN RGDP = - + b b b   (2) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0 1 2 3 4 log log( ) log( ) log log
RUS REXP RRBL REXR WTR RGDP = + + + + g g g g g   (3) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0 1 2 3 4 5 log log log log( ) log( ) log( ) RIMP RGDP REM RRBL REXR OIL = + + - - + d d d d d d   (4) 
YDP GDP REM REV TRA º + - +   (5) 
CIN GCO IMP EXP INV CON GDP + + - + + º   (6) 
,  ,  ,  ,  , 
CON INV EXP IMP YDP GDP
RCON RINV REXP RIMP RYDP RGDP
P P P P P P
º º º º º º   (7) 
(b) money, BOP, interest rates and exchange rates   
( ) ( ) 0 1 2 3
2
log log log
M D
SIN RGDP REM
P
  = - + +  
 
z z z z  
(8) 
( ) ( ) 0 1 2 log log log
FCD
d EXR REM
P
  = + +  
 
V V V  
(9) 
2 0
2 2 ,  ,  ,  ,  , 
0 2 2 ( $* )
$ 0
, 
$
M GDP FCD M
M M D FCD MMP VEL DOL RPT
M M M RES EXR
RES M
RAR SGNY
IMP GDP
D
º + º º º º
D
D
º º
 
(10) 
0 $* M CBC CLG CGD RES EXR º + - +   (11) 
$ $ $ $ ( $) BOP CUA FIA ERR d RES º + + º   (12) 
$ $ $, CUA EXP IMP º - $ $ $ $ $ FIA FDI FDO REM OCF º - + +   (13) 
( ) log ,
USA SIN SIN d EXR RP º + + log( ) RSIN SIN d P º -   (14) 
* *
* ,  , 
US RUS
RUS EXR PPI RBL PPI
RBL EXR EXR REXR RRBL
P P
= º º  
(15) 
 Macroeconomic Adjustment in Armenia: The Role of External Factors 
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(c) prices, wages and (un)employment   
0 1 2 log( ) log( ) log EMP RGDP RWAG = + + l l l   (16) 
,  , 
RGDP WAG
LAB EMP UNE PRO RWAG
EMP P
º + º º   (17) 
0 1 2 3 log( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) d WAG d P UNE d PRO = + + + n n n n   (18) 
0 1 2 3 4 log( ) log( ) log( ) log( * ) log( 2) d P d WAG d EXR d OIL EXR d M = + + + + h h h h h   (19) 
(d) public finance   
( ) ( ) 0 1 log log REV GDP c c = +   (20) 
, 
REV GEX
DEFY SGNY TRA GEX GCO
GDP
-
º + º -  
(21) 
   
All variables are in domestic currency, unless otherwise indicated. The first building 
block defines aggregate demand. (1) gives real private consumption (RCON) as a 
function of real disposable income (RYDP) and the real interest rate (RSIN). Real 
consumption is obtained by deflating private consumption by the domestic price 
level, which is approximated by the CPI deflator (P), in the absence of a quarterly 
GDP deflator. Disposable income (YDP) is defined in a relatively crude way in (5) –
for reasons of data-availability- using GDP, net transfers to the government (REV-
TRA)  and  also  remittances  (REM)  received  from  abroad.  As  explained  above 
remittances constitute a significant part of household income in Armenia and by 
introducing them here in the consumption function of the macroeconomic model –
via households’ disposable incomes- we can analyze their effects via this channel. 
Remittances in the  model will generate a set of effects  through this important 
channel: by their effect on disposable income they affect consumption and thereby 
through  a  range  of  second-round  effects  all  real  and  nominal  variables. 
Remittances also transmit themselves via other channels: they affect directly the 
balance-of-payments, imports and money demand as explained below.  
The real interest rate is defined in (14) as the nominal short-term interest rate 
(SIN), minus  inflation. Interest rates and exchange rates are linked through the 
uncovered interest rate parity cum (exogenous) risk premium (RP) in (14). GDP is 
defined in (6) as the sum of consumption (CON), investment (INV), net exports 
(EXP-IMP), government consumption (GCO), and inventory accumulation (CIN). (7) 
defines  real  consumption,  real  investment,  real  exports,  real  imports,  real 
disposable income and real GDP. 
Real private investment (RINV), (2) is assumed to depend on the real interest rate 
(by  a  cost-of-capital  argument)  and  real  output  (by  an “accelerator”  argument) 
(RGDP).  Real  exports  (REXP),  in  (3)  depend  on  competitiveness  vis-à-vis  the  US 
(REXR) -defined in (15) as the nominal US$ exchange rate (EXR) times the relative 
output price level-, competitiveness vis-à-vis Russia (RRBL), world trade (WTR) and 
Russian real output (RGDPRUS). Similarly, real imports (RIMP) in (4) depend on 
competitiveness vis-à-vis the US and Russia, domestic real output, remittances and 
the oil price (OIL). Bas van AARLE & Robert SOSOIAN 
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The second block links money, balance of payments, interest rates and exchange 
rates.  Broad  money  demand  for  domestic  currency  (M2D)  is  given  in  (8)  as  a 
function of real output, remittances and the nominal interest rate. The demand for 
foreign currency deposits (FCD) is assumed to depend on depreciation of the Dram 
and remittances according to (9). The total money supply (M2) equals the sum of 
broad  money  in  domestic  currency  and  foreign  currency  deposits  and  is 
determined by the workings of the money multiplier (MMP) on the stock of base 
money  (M0)  according  to  (10).  (10)  also  defines  velocity  of  money  (VEL), 
dollarization  (DOL),  reserve  pass-trough  (RPT),  reserve  adequacy  (RAR)  and 
seignorage to GDP (SGNY), variables that are useful in monetary analysis to analyze 
various aspects relating to monetary policy. The reserve pass-through indicator is 
an indicator of the degree of sterilization of foreign exchange interventions since it 
measures the extent to which changes in net foreign reserves are reflected in the 
monetary base4. A value of 0 implies perfect sterilization, a value between 0 and 
100% implies imperfect sterilization as reserves and base money move in the same 
direction. The reserve adequacy measures the coverage of 3 months of imports by 
reserves and can be used as a measure of exchange rate pressure/sustainability of 
balance-of-payments  imbalances  in  the  model.  Base  money  itself  consists 
according  to  (11)  of  a  domestic  component  –credit  of  the  Central  Bank  to  the 
banking  sector  (CBC),  and  to  the  government,  (CLG-CGD)-  and  a  foreign 
component –the foreign exchange reserves (RES$).  
The balance of payments (BOP$, defined in mln US$) is defined in (12) as the sum 
of  the  current  account  (CUA$),  financial  account  (FIA$)  and  net  errors  and 
omissions (ERR$), matching the change in foreign exchange reserves. In (13), the 
current  account  equals  exports  of  goods  and  services  minus  imports  and  the 
financial  account  equals  net  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI$-FDO$),  foreign 
remittances (REM$) and other capital flows (OCF$), which consists to a large extent 
of  short-run  portfolio  capital  flows.  Both  foreign  direct  investment  and  other 
capital flows remain exogenous in the model, for simplicity.  
In the definitions of the foreign reserve accumulation, the balance-of-payments 
and base money, we see a second important way in which remittances enter the 
model: remittances are a sizeable balance of payments item in the case of Armenia 
and thereby affect reserve accumulation and –to the extent interventions are non-
sterilized- base money growth.  
Labor demand (EMP) in (16) is a function of (i) real output and (ii) the real producer 
wage (RWAG) which serves  as a proxy of labor  costs. In (17), the real  wage is 
defined as the nominal wage (WAG) deflated by the price level and productivity is 
defined as real GDP per employee. The supply of labor (LAB) is defined as the sum 
of employed and unemployed persons (UNE). Note that the labor demand function 
                                                           
4 Although less likely, a negative value of RPT is a possibility. It amounts to a form of ‘super-sterilization’ 
since in that case foreign reserves and base money change in opposite directions. Macroeconomic Adjustment in Armenia: The Role of External Factors 
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can be interpreted as an inverted production function in the model in case we 
assume here that the capital stock is approximately constant in the short-run. 
Wage inflation according to (18) is driven by increases in output prices -reflecting 
wage indexation-, the level of unemployment -reflecting a Phillips-curve element-, 
and changes in productivity. The last effect could reflect the pressure on wages 
(and thereby on prices) from the Balassa-Samuelson effect that is often thought to 
have significant inflationary impacts in transition countries and an important factor 
behind  the  trend  real  appreciation  noticed  in  many  countries.  Increases  of 
domestic prices in (19) are the result of wage increases, depreciations of the Dram 
(reflecting pass-through), increases in oil prices and broad money growth. 
Government revenues (REV) are related to output according to (20), government 
spending (GEX) equals government consumption and transfers that will be held 
exogenous.  The  fiscal  deficit  to  GDP  ratio,  (DEFY),  is  defined  in  (21)  as  the 
difference  between  total  government  revenue  (plus  seignorage)  and  total 
government spending. 
The model thus consists of 10 estimated macroeconomic relations ((1)-(4), (8),(9), 
(16), (18)-(20)) plus 35 definitions. As a result, it contains 21 exogenous variables 
(CGD, CIN, CLB, CLG, ERR$, EXR, EXRRUS, FDI$, FDO$, GCO, GDPRUS, LAB, OCF$, 
OIL,  PPIRUS,  PPIUS,  REM$,  RP,  SINUS,  TRA,  WTR)  and  43  endogenous  variables 
(BOP$, CON, CUA$, CUAY, DEFY, DOL, EMP, EXP, FCD, FIA$, GDP, IMP, INV, M0, M2, 
M2D, MMP, P, PRO, RAR, RBL, RCIN, RCON, RES$, REV, REXP, REXR, RGCO, RGDP, 
RIMP, RINV, RPT, RRBL, RREV, RWAG, RYDP, SGNY, SIN, UNE, UNR, VEL, WAG, YDP).  
4. Model Estimation and Simulation 
When estimating the 10 structural relations we need to take into account a number 
of  aspects:  (i)  the  limited  quality  of  the  data  (e.g.  restricted  number  of 
observations), (ii) seasonal patterns in the data, (iii) non-stationarity of almost all 
variables. The Appendix provides details on the data set that is used. All data are at 
a quarterly frequency and are mainly from the IMF International Financial Statistics 
and  Armenian  national  sources  and  cover  the  sample  1996:I-2007:IV.  Seasonal 
adjustment of the variables is undertaken using the Census X-12 method. 
To  take  into  consideration  that  practically  all  variables  are  non-stationary,  the 
structural  equations  of  the  model  are  estimated  in  the  form  of  a  vector  error 
correction  model  (VECM).  A  VECM  is  a  restricted  vector  auto-regressive  model 
designed for use with non-stationary series that are co-integrated. The VECM has 
the co-integration relations built into the specifications so that it restricts the long-
run  behaviour  of  the  endogenous  variables  to  converge  to  their  co-integrating 
relationship while considering at the same time the short-run adjustment dynamics 
towards  the  long-run  equilibrium.  The  cointegrating  relations  in  other  words 
correspond with the long-run relation assumed by eqs. (1)-(4), (8)-(9), (16), (18)-Bas van AARLE & Robert SOSOIAN 
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(20). The error-correction terms measure how deviations from long-run equilibrium 
are affecting the short-run adjustment dynamics.  
The estimation results found for real consumption growth, real investment growth, 
real exports growth, real imports growth, broad money growth (in domestic and 
foreign  currency),  government  revenue  growth,  employment  growth,  wage 
inflation and price inflation are provided in the Appendix. The long-run elasticities 
are  grouped  in  the  first  part  of  the  tables  which  displays  the  co-integrating 
equation, the short-run elasticities are found in the second part, together with the 
error-correction term.5 Generally we find more evidence for the expected signs of 
the coefficients in the long-run relations than in the short-run dynamics where we 
allow up to four lags in the specifications. Consumption seems mostly driven by 
real disposable income (which includes remittances as noted earlier) and less by 
real  interest  rate  changes.  The  real  interest  rate  effect  is  stronger  in  case  of 
investment which is also strongly driven by output. Note that the initial negative 
short-run effect is compensated over time by the positive effect from the long-run 
cointegrating relation.  
A  real  depreciation  against  the  Russian  Ruble  and  world  trade  are  important 
determinants  of  Armenian  export  growth  according  to  the  estimates.6  Output, 
remittances, real US$ and Ruble exchange rates and the oil price (in Dram) account 
for imports mostly in plausible ways,  even if the degree of  explanation by this 
import function is relatively low. Two money demand functions are estimated: the 
demand for money M2 denominated in dram and foreign currency deposits; this 
will enable us to analyze dollarization in the model. Money demand in dram is 
determined by usual determinants as GDP and short term interest rates and in 
addition by remittances. The demand for foreign currency is found to be quite well 
explained  by  the  rate  of  depreciation  of  the  Dram  and  the  remittances. 
Government  revenues  have  been  modeled  in  a  simple  manner,  assuming  GDP 
being  their  main  determinant.  Nevertheless,  the  empirical  estimation  of  this 
government revenue functions appears adequate. 
The estimated structural relations yield –together with the set of definitions in the 
model- a small but concise macroeconomic model that provides an account of the 
goods, labor and money market and foreign sector. In most cases the structural 
relations could be estimated with some degree of plausibility and accuracy; model 
simulation is now needed to assess the tracking ability of the estimated model.  
                                                           
5 The VECM has the co-integration relations built into the specifications so that it restricts the long-run 
behaviour of the endogenous variables to converge to their co-integrating relationship while considering 
at  the  same  time  the  short-run  adjustment  dynamics  towards  the  long-run  equilibrium.  The  co-
integration term is known as the error-correction term since the deviation from long-run equilibrium is 
corrected gradually through a series of partial short-run adjustments. 
6 The real US$ exchange rate and Russian real GDP were left out in the final estimation (3) as their 
inclusion leads to a very poorly estimation of the export function, probably due to multi-collinearity. Macroeconomic Adjustment in Armenia: The Role of External Factors 
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Monetary and exchange rate policies play an important role in the model and may 
need  some  additional  explanation.  In  case  of  exchange  rate  targeting,  the 
exchange rate is set according to a pre-determined path, leaving interest rates, 
money balances and foreign reserves to adjust to any ex-ante disequilibrium in 
money and financial markets, according to (14), (8)-(12) respectively. A monetary 
targeting  policy  implies  that  base  money  growth  is  set  according  to  a  pre-
determined  path,  leaving  interest  rates  and  exchange  rates  to  adjust;  in  other 
words it implies a floating exchange rate regime. In addition, the model could be 
set up in  such a  way that interest rate targeting, a currency board or inflation 
targeting strategies could be approximated. It should be noted that the outcomes 
of  in-sample  simulations  with  the  model  are  not  critically  dependent  on  the 
assumptions  about  the  monetary  regime,  it  merely  concerns  the  assumptions 
which monetary variables are pre-determined and which are endogenous. With 
out-of-sample  forecasting  exercises  the  assumptions  about  the  monetary  policy 
regime are of course more crucial than in the in-sample dynamic simulations. In the 
simulations,  we  assume  an  exchange  rate  targeting  strategy,  implying  that  the 
exchange rate is set according to some pre-specified path, leaving foreign reserves 
and base money endogenous. This assumption appears applicable to the case of 
Armenia currently. As noted in Section 2, the CBA considers to adopt an inflation 
targeting  strategy.  Even  this  strategy  may  not  be  entirely  contradictory  to  our 
approach  here  in  case  the  exchange  rate  will  be  used  as  the  main  operational 
target as it is likely to be the case. 
Figure 1 provides a dynamic in-sample simulation of the model. The  solid lines 
indicate the actual data, the dotted lines the simulated adjustment according to 
the  model.  The  model  is  simulated  for  the  three-year  period  2005:I-2007:IV. 
Dynamic simulations are an appropriate (and demanding) manner to assess the 
tracking ability of models. Dynamic simulation implies that the simulation model is 
provided the adjustment path of the exogenous variables plus the initial value of 
the endogenous variables in the model. It answers the question whether or not the 
model  –given  the  adjustment  of  the  exogenous  variables-  would  predict 
comparable adjustment dynamics as those that have actually resulted. 
Even if the model does not track all variables exactly –as to be expected given the 
simplicity  of  the  model  and  the  complexity  of  actual  macroeconomic 
developments- the model in many cases follows quite well the direction of the 
observed adjustments. Bas van AARLE & Robert SOSOIAN 
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Figure 1: In-sample simulation 2006: I – 2007: IV 
5. Alternative Macroeconomic Scenarios 
In  this  section  we  simulate  a  few  out-of-sample  scenarios  of  the  small-scale 
dynamic  macroeconomic  model  of  the  Armenian  economy.  The  simulations 
concern a three year period, 2008:I-2010:IV. In the baseline scenario the model is Macroeconomic Adjustment in Armenia: The Role of External Factors 
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simulated using the paths for the exogenous variables as specified in Table 3. While 
the  results  in  the  baseline  scenario  are  sensitive  -at  least  to  some  extent-  to 
assumptions about each exogenous variable itself, it is assumed that the baseline is 
not  too  unrealistic  to  serve  as  a  reference  that  can  be  used  to  compare  the 
outcomes  under  the  following  changes  in  exogenous  variables:  Scenario  1 
considers a decrease in remittances, Scenario 2 an appreciation of the exchange 
rate,  Scenario  3  an  increase  in  the  oil  price,  Scenario  4  an  increase  in  the  risk 
premium,  and  Scenario  5  a  decrease  in  the  growth  rate  of  government 
consumption. 
Table 3: Baseline and alternative scenarios, 2008: I-2011: IV. 
Baseline scenario 2008:I 2010:IV     
CGD : constant  GEX : 10% growth p.a. 
CIN : constant   LAB : constant 
CLB : constant   OCF$: 0 
CLG : constant   OIL : 85$ 
ERR$ : 0   PPI_US : 3% growth p.a. 
EXR : 325    PPI_RUS : 8% growth p.a. 
EXR_RUS : 25   REM$ : 425 mln US$ 
FDI$ : 200 mln US$   SIN_US : 3% p.a. 
FDO$ : 0    WTR: 6% growth p.a.   
GCO : 10% growth p.a.      
GDP_RUS : 14% growth p.a.    
Alternative scenarios 2008:I 2010:IV   
REM$_1 = 325 mln US$   
EXR_2 = 300   
OIL_3 = 125 US$ 
RP_4 = 6% p.a. 
GCO_5 = 6% growth p.a. 
The first alternative scenario demonstrates the important role of remittances in the 
Armenian  economy.  Changes  in  remittances  are  transmitted  through  various 
channels in the model as explained in description of the model. In the baseline 
remittances equal 425 mln US$ (per quarter) and in Scenario 1 remittances are 
reduced  to  325  mln  US$.  Figure  2  shows  the  simulated  effects  of  the  drop  in 
remittances. 
Compared  to  the  baseline,  a  drop  in  remittances,  decreases  consumption  as 
disposable  income  decreases.  Imports  decline  with  a  lag  and  this  starts  to 
contribute to GDP growth catching up again with the baseline after an initial drop 
in growth compared to baseline. Since remittances are a balance-of-payments item 
(included in the financial account), the drop in remittances has direct consequences 
in the form of a lower balance-of-payments surplus, lower foreign reserves and 
lower (base) money (growth). Another effect of remittances in the model results 
from the impact of foreign currency deposits and dollarization: lower remittances 
reduce  dollarization.  Finally,  the  lower  rate  of  base  money  growth  reduces 
seignorage revenues, thereby resulting also in some fiscal fall-out. This example, Bas van AARLE & Robert SOSOIAN 
 
 
Page | 64                                                                               EJBE 2010, 3(5) 
therefore, illustrates quite directly, the importance of foreign remittances to the 
Armenian  economy  and  the  presences  of  a  number  of  different  channels  that 
contribute to this.
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Figure 2: Simulation 2008: I – 2010: IV, baseline vs. Scenario 1, a decrease 
in remittances. 
                                                           
7 In case of a floating exchange rate, results of a change in remittances would be quite different: in that 
case a decrease in remittances would be absorbed by a depreciation of the exchange rate which would 
crowd-in net exports thereby compensating for the drop in consumption resulting from the drop in 
remittances. Macroeconomic Adjustment in Armenia: The Role of External Factors 
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In Scenario 2 we study the effects of an instantaneous revaluation of the Dram of 
7.5% from 325 in the baseline to 300 per US$ in Scenario 28. The effects that these 
alternative exchange rate scenarios produce are given in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Simulation 2008: I – 2010: IV, baseline vs Scenario 2, an 
appreciation Dram. 
                                                           
8 Note that in the model this is at the same time a 7.5% depreciation against the Ruble. Bas van AARLE & Robert SOSOIAN 
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An appreciation of the exchange rate has a large number of effects in a small open 
economy like Armenia. Firstly there are trade effects: exports tend to grow less 
than in the baseline and imports to grow faster as the nominal appreciation is also 
a real appreciation as is seen in the adjustment of the real exchange rate against 
the Dollar and Ruble. Secondly, price effects reduce the price of imports and oil in 
domestic currency which moderates domestic inflation. Thirdly, dollar remittances 
(assuming  that  their  volume  remains  constant)  decline  in  value  in  terms  of 
domestic  currency,  dragging  disposable  income  and  consumption  growth  quite 
markedly in the example. This perhaps less obvious effect may actually be quite 
important in the case of Armenia where remittances are sizeable. The simulated 
effect on real disposable income and consumption is indeed considerable even if of 
course also other transmission mechanisms may play a role. Fourthly, the decline in 
the  current  account  has  a  negative  impact  (all  compared  to  baseline)  on  the 
balance-of-payments, foreign reserves and base money growth. Finally, there is a 
direct  effect  on  dollarization  as  an  appreciation  makes  holding  Drams  more 
attractive compared to foreign currency. 
In Scenario 3 the oil price increases to 125$ compared to the baseline of 85$. In 
contrast to other countries in the region, Armenia has no oil and gas production 
and is dependent on imports to cover its energy needs. Figure 4 displays the effects 
of this oil price shift in the model. 
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Figure 4: Simulation 2008: I – 2010: IV, baseline vs. Scenario 3, an increase 
in oil price. 
The  increase  in  the  oil  price  is  a  shift  factor  in  imports  of  importance.  In  the 
simulation of this shock in the model, imports increase, real output growth declines 
and price and wage inflation rise as a result of the higher oil price (compared to the 
baseline).  The  reduction  of  the  current  account  balance  implies  a  reduction  in 
foreign reserves reducing base money growth. Given the increase in imports and 
the reduction in foreign reserves, the reserve adequacy ratio is reduced from two 
sides.  We  observe  somewhat  lower  employment  growth  and  a  higher 
unemployment rate due to lower output growth.9  
Armenia has undertaken a rapid liberalization process since 1999. This has led to a 
very  liberalized  capital  account.  Notwithstanding  many  economic  benefits  that 
relate to having much improved access to international financial markets, it may 
also increase vulnerabilities to disruptions in international financial markets and 
speculative flows. There are two places in our model where increased financial 
turmoil may exert their impact on the Armenian economy: a change in the amount 
of short-term speculative capital inflows variable, OCF, and a change in the risk 
premium on Armenian financial assets, RP. 10 Both are exogenous in the model for 
simplicity. We concentrate on the effects of changes in the Armenian risk premium 
                                                           
9  Increasing  energy  subsidies  would  be  another  possible  consequence  of  higher  oil  prices  for  the 
Armenian economy, inducing an increase in the deficit. We have not included such a mechanism in 
government spending and kept it exogenous in the model. 
10  See Pogosyan  et  al.  (2008)  for  a model  that  endogenizes  the  risk  premium  on  Armenian  assets. 
Interestingly, their results point at the possibility that interventions by the CBA and remittances could be 
important determinants to the Armenian risk premium. Bas van AARLE & Robert SOSOIAN 
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(reflecting e.g. changing perceptions of Armenian macroeconomic and/or political 
stability, or even broader changes in perceptions on emerging market economies 
making investors more or less risk averse towards investing in them). In Scenario 4 
(displayed in Figure 5), an increase in the risk premium is simulated: it shows the 
effects of an increase from 3% in the baseline to 6%.  
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Figure 5: Simulation 2008: I – 2010: IV, baseline vs. Scenario 4, an increase 
in risk premium. Macroeconomic Adjustment in Armenia: The Role of External Factors 
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The transmission channels of this shock in the model are as follows: the increase in 
the Armenian risk premium increase interest rates. This directly affects investment 
and consumption as real borrowing costs increase. Lower output growth reduces 
employment and imports. As a result of the latter, the current account balance 
improves, and foreign reserves and base money increase compared to the baseline. 
Higher interest rates also reduce the demand for broad money which on its turn 
moderates inflation and thereby wage growth. 
The Armenian government has maintained a balanced budget during the last years 
as  part  of  a  comprehensive  fiscal  reform  and  consolidation  strategy,  achieving 
more fiscal sustainability after several years of rampant fiscal deficits in the 1990s. 
Also  ‘off-budget’  items  e.g.  implicit  liabilities  relating  to  arrears,  pensions  and 
energy-related subsidies appear to be more controlled and this ‘quasi-fiscal deficit’ 
reduced. The size of the government in GDP has also been gradually reduced, partly 
of  course  also  due  to  a  denominator  effect  with  higher  growth.  In  our  last 
simulation example –found in Figure 6- we take a closer look at the possible effects 
of  fiscal  adjustments  in  the  current  Armenian  context.  Scenario  5  assumes  an 
decrease in the growth rate of government consumption from 10% in the baseline 
to 6% in Scenario 5, reflecting e.g. an expenditure rationalization and improved 
fiscal  management  strategy  that  may  have  some  plausibility  in  the  case  of  the 
Armenian fiscal outlays. 
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Figure 6: Simulation 2008: I – 2010: IV, baseline vs. Scenario 5, a decrease 
in government consumption growth. 
The transmission channels of fiscal policy in the model are rather standard and 
focus on the spending effects: lower government consumption reduces spending 
and thereby output. This creates second order negative effects on variables such as 
consumption,  imports,  employment,  current  account  and  money.  Effects  on 
nominal variables such as prices, exchange rate are very small. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper developed, estimated and simulated a small, dynamic macro-economic 
model of the Armenian economy. Aim was to construct a model that was both not 
too large in the light of data limitations but would at the same time incorporate 
and  highlight  a  number  of  interesting  mechanisms  that  are  important 
characteristics  of  the  Armenian  economy:  the  transition  from  low  growth,  high 
inflation  to  high  growth,  low  inflation,  financial  and  monetary  deepening,  the 
important role of remittances and the exchange rate, the presence of dollarization 
and strong and direct transmissions of monetary policy in this small open economy.  
The model enables to analyze the effects on internal and external balance and 
goods-, labour- and money market dynamics in the Armenian economy produced 
by shocks to a set of exogenous variables. We focused on the possible effects of 
shocks to remittances, exchange rate, oil price, risk premium on Armenian assets 
and government consumption using out-of-sample simulations of the model of the 
Armenian economy during the period 2008:I-2010:IV.  
These  simulations  gave  in  particularly  more  insight  into  the  important  role  of 
remittances,  the  exchange  rate  and  energy  prices  in  the  Armenian  and  how Macroeconomic Adjustment in Armenia: The Role of External Factors 
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changes therein may transmit themselves in various ways to the most important 
Armenian macroeconomic variables.  
Extensions of the analysis can be envisaged in several directions: extending the 
number of shocks by considering e.g. shocks to FDI inflows or shocks to world trade 
reflecting the recent global economic slowdown. More generally, the effects of the 
recent  global  economic  slowdown  is  likely  to  affect  the  Armenian  economy  in 
various ways. The current analysis identified the main channels by which the global 
factors may affect the Armenian economy. It would be interesting to analyse this 
more systematically in an follow-up study of the current one as preliminary data 
suggest that Armenian growth stalled during 2009. Another interesting directions 
could  be  to  add  additional  mechanisms  to  the  fiscal  block  in  the  form  of 
endogenous  fiscal  spending  and  the  accumulation  of  domestic  and  foreign 
government debt. This is also left here for future research. 
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Appendix: Data sources and Estimation results 
The following data have been used in the analysis: 
Table A.1: Variables and Data Sources 
Variable  Name  Units  Source 
CON  Private consumption  bln n.c.  IMF IFS line 96F..ZF and nat.stat.off. 
RCON  Real consumption  bln n.c.  calculated as RCONºCON/P 
SIN  Money market interest rate  %  IMF IFS line 60B..ZF 
YDP  Disposable income  bln n.c.  calculated as YDPºGDP+REM-REV+TRA 
RYDP  Real disposable income  bln n.c.  calculated as RYDPºYDP/P 
INV  Gross fixed capital formation  bln n.c.  IMF IFS line 93E..ZF and nat.stat.off. 
GDP  Gross domestic product  bln n.c.  calculated  as  GDPºCON+INV+EXP-
IMP+CIN+GCO 
P  CPI/Price level  1995=100  IMF IFS line 64..ZF 
RGDP  Real gross domestic product  bln n.c.  calculated as RGDPºGDP/P 
EXP  Exports of goods and services  bln n.c.  IMF IFS line 90C..ZF and nat.stat.off. 
REXP  Real exports  bln n.c.  calculated as REXPºEXP/P 
EXR  Exchange rate vs US$  per.avg  IMF IFS line ..RF.ZF 
REXR  Real exchange rate vs US$  per.avg  calculated as REXRºEXR*PPI
US/P 
WTR  World trade  bln US$  calculated from IMF IFS 
IMP  Imports of goods and services  bln n.c.  IMF IFS line 98C..ZF and nat.stat.off. 
RIMP  Real imports  bln n.c.  calculated as RIMPºIMP/P 
OIL  Oil price  $ per barrel  IMF IFS line 
M2  Money, M2  bln n.c  National Bank of Armenia 
M2D  Money, M2 denominated in n.c.  bln n.c.  calculated from M2 - FCD 
FCD  Foreign currency deposits  bln n.c.  National Bank of Armenia 
EMP  Employment  1000 persons  IMF IFS line 67E..ZF and nat.stat.off. 
WAG  Wages  n.c.  IMF IFS line 65...ZF and nat.stat.off. 
UNE  Unemployment  1000 persons  IMF IFS line 67C..ZF and nat.stat.off. 
REV  Government revenue  bln n.c.  IMF IFS line 81...ZF and nat.stat.off. 
GEX  Government expenditure  bln n.c.  IMF IFS line 82...ZF and nat.stat.off. 
GCO  Government consumption  bln n.c.  IMF IFS line 91F..ZF and nat.stat.off. 
CIN  Change in inventories  bln n.c.  IMF IFS line 93L..ZF and nat.stat.off. 
RES$  Foreign exchange reserves  mln US$   IMF IFS line .1L.DZF 
CUA$  Trade balance  mln US$  calculated as CUAº(EXP-IMP)/EXR 
FIA$  Capital account  mln US$  IMF IFS line 78BJDZF 
FDI$  Foreign direct investment  mln US$   IMF IFS line 78BEDZF 
FDO$  Outward FDI  mln US$   IMF IFS line 78BEDZF 
OCF$  Other capital flows  mln US$  calculated as OCF$ºFIA$-FDI$+FDO$ 
REM$  Remittances in US$  mln US$   
REM  Remittances in n.c.  mln dram, quarterly  calculated as REM$*EXR 
M0  Base money, M0  bln n.c.  IMF IFS line 14..ZF and NBA 
CBC  Central Bank credit to banks  bln n.c.  IMF IFS line 12E..ZF and NBA 
CLG  Central Bank lending to govt.  bln n.c.  IMF IFS line 12A..ZF and NBA 
CGD  Deposits govt. at CB  bln n.c.  IMF IFS line 16D..ZF and NBA 
LAB  Labour force  1000 persons  calculated as LABºEMP+UNE 
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Table A.2: Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Sample: 1996Q1 2007Q4 (48 observations) 
t-statistics in brackets, _SA denotes seasonally adjusted 
(1)  Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1 
LOG(RCON_SA(-1)) = 0.08*(SIN(-1)-@PCY(P_SA(-1)))/100+0.69*LOG(RYDP_SA(-1))-3.92 
    [2.14]      [35.04]  [0.76] 
Error correction   
D(LOG(RCON_SA))  = -0.36*CointEq1-0.003*D(LOG(RCON_SA(-1)))-0.11*D(LOG(RCON_SA(-2))) 
    [-1.26]    [-0.01]    [-0.53]   
-0.06*D(LOG(RCON_SA(-3)))+0.11*D((SIN(-1)-@PCY(P_SA(-1)))/100)-0.08*D((SIN(-2) 
[-0.37]      [1.18]      [-1.27] 
-@PCY(P_SA(-2)))/100)-0.02*D((SIN(-3)-@PCY(P_SA(-3)))/100) -0.14*D(LOG(RYDP_SA(-1))) 
    [-1.14]      [-0.84] 
--0.08*D(LOG(RYDP_SA(-2)))-0.01*D(LOG(RYDP_SA(-3)))+0.03 
[-0.48]      [-0.08]    [ 2.43] 
R-squared: 0.34    Adj. R-squared: 0.16    Sum sq. resids: 0.05 
S.E. equation: 0.04    F-statistic: 1.90    Log likelihood: 98.27 
Mean dependent: 0.02    S.D. dependent: 0.04 
(2)  Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1 
LOG(RINV_SA(-1)) = -1.53*(SIN(-1)-@PCY(P_SA(-1)))/100+1.60*LOG(RGDP_SA(-1))-8.86 
    [-2.54]      [5.16]  [-1.76] 
Error Correction:   
D(LOG(RINV_SA)) = -0.15*CointEq1+0.10*D(LOG(RINV_SA(-1)))-0.18*D(LOG(RINV_SA(-2))) 
    [-2.93]  [0.83]    [-1.50] 
-0.02*D((SIN(-1)-@PCY(P_SA(-1)))/100)+0.09*D((SIN(-2)-@PCY(P_SA(-2)))/100) 
[-0.17]          [0.72]     
-0.63*D(LOG(RGDP_SA(-1)))+0.06*D(LOG(RGDP_SA(-2)))+0.049 
[-1.48]      [0.13]    [2.40] 
R-squared: 0.66    Adj. R-squared: 0.55    Sum sq. resids: 0.21 
S.E. equation: 0.08    F-statistic: 6.21    Log likelihood: 62.29 
Mean dependent: 0.05    S.D. dependent: 0.12 
(3)  Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1 
LOG(REXP_SA(-1)) = 0.41*LOG(RRBL_SA(-1))+0.75*LOG(WTR_SA(-1))-12.35 
    [4.26]    [7.90]  [-4.34] 
Error Correction:   
D(LOG(REXP_SA)) = -0.37*CointEq1+0.01*D(LOG(REXP_SA(-1)))+0.52*D(LOG(REXP_SA(-2))) 
    [-2.31]  [0.03]    [ 2.52]   
+0.64*D(LOG(REXP_SA(-3)))+0.18*D(LOG(REXP_SA(-4)))-0.07*D(LOG(RRBL_SA(-1))) 
[3.16]      [1.23]    [-0.75]   
-0.18*D(LOG(RRBL_SA(-2)))-0.02*D(LOG(RRBL_SA(-3)))+0.22*D(LOG(RRBL_SA(-4))) 
[-2.02]      [-0.18]    [2.73] 
+1.28*D(LOG(WTR_SA(-1)))+1.04*D(LOG(WTR_SA(-2)))+0.42*D(LOG(WTR_SA(-3))) 
[2.18]      [1.81]    [ 0.69] 
+0.18*D(LOG(WTR_SA(-4)))+0.42*D(LOG(RGDP_RUS_SA*EXR)) 
[0.34]      [ 2.30]   
R-squared: 0.68    Adj. R-squared: 0.52    Sum sq. resids: 0.20 
S.E. equation: 0.08    F-statistic: 4.06    Log likelihood: 61.19 
Mean dependent: 0.02    S.D. dependent: 0.12 
(4)  Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1 
LOG(RIMP_SA(-1) = -0.14*LOG(RGDP_SA(-1))+0.94*LOG(REM_SA(-1)*EXR(-1)) 
    [-0.90]    [6.53]     
-0.56*LOG(RRBL_SA(-1))+0.74*LOG(REXR_SA(-1)) 
[-7.41]      [8.36] 
Error Correction:   
D(LOG(RIMP_SA)) = -0.09*CointEq1-0.34*D(LOG(RIMP_SA(-1)))-0.09*D(LOG(RIMP_SA(-2))) 
    [-0.49]  [-1.44]    [-0.36]     
+0.18*D(LOG(RIMP_SA(-3)))-0.16*D(LOG(RIMP_SA(-4)))+0.07*D(LOG(RGDP_SA(-1))) 
[0.70]      [-0.74]    [0.17]   Bas van AARLE & Robert SOSOIAN 
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+0.23*D(LOG(RGDP_SA(-2)))+0.43*D(LOG(RGDP_SA(-3)))+0.52*D(LOG(RGDP_SA(-4))) 
[0.61]      [1.00]    [1.24]   
-0.16*D(LOG(REM_SA(-1)*EXR(-1)))-0.17*D(LOG(REM_SA(-2)*EXR(-2))) 
[-1.35]      [-1.78]       
-0.12*D(LOG(REM_SA(-3)*EXR(-3)))-0.01*D(LOG(REM_SA(-4)*EXR(-4))) 
[-1.31]      [-0.06]       
+0.10*D(LOG(RRBL_SA(-1)))+0.27*D(LOG(RRBL_SA(-2)))-0.01*D(LOG(RRBL_SA(-3))) 
[0.46]      [ 0.83]    [-0.02]   
-0.06*D(LOG(RRBL_SA(-4)))-0.14*D(LOG(REXR_SA(-1)))-0.43*D(LOG(REXR_SA(-2))) 
[-0.32]      [-0.62]    [-1.21] 
-0.16*D(LOG(REXR_SA(-3)))+0.02*D(LOG(REXR_SA(-4)))+0.03*D(LOG(OIL*EXR)) 
[-0.45]      [ 0.09]    [0.49] 
R-squared: 0.52    Adj. R-squared: 0.11    Sum sq. resids: 0.14 
S.E. equation: 0.073    F-statistic: 1.26    Log likelihood: 71.03 
Mean dependent: 0.02    S.D. dependent: 0.08 
(5)  Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1   
LOG(M2D_SA(-1)*100/P_SA(-1)) =    -1.71*SIN(-1)/100+0.08*LOG(RGDP_SA(-1))) 
      [-3.54]    [0.16] 
+1.12*LOG(REM_SA(-1)*EXR(-1)) 
[1.83273] 
Error Correction:   
D(LOG(M2D_SA*100/P_SA)) = -0.04*CointEq1-0.01*D(LOG(M2D_SA(-1)*100/P_SA(-1))) 
      [-2.67]  [-0.05]     
+0.18*D(LOG(M2D_SA(-2)*100/P_SA(-2)))+0.26*D(LOG(M2D_SA(-3)*100/P_SA(-3))) 
[1.15]        [1.75]     
+0.14*D(SIN(-1)/100)+0.22*D(SIN(-2)/100)-0.36*D(SIN(-3)/100) 
[0.67]    [1.24]    [-1.99]     
+0.001*D(LOG(RGDP_SA(-1)))-0.32*D(LOG(RGDP_SA(-2)))-0.31*D(LOG(RGDP_SA(-3))) 
[0.00]      [-0.90]    [-0.96]   
-0.13*D(LOG(REM_SA(-1)*EXR(-1)))-0.07*D(LOG(REM_SA(-2)*EXR(-2))) -0.07*D(LOG(REM_SA(-3)*EXR(-3))) 
[-2.13]      [-1.06]       [-1.24] 
R-squared: 0.37    Adj. R-squared: 0.16    Sum sq. resids: 0.15 
S.E. equation: 0.07    F-statistic: 1.72    Log likelihood: 70.90 
Mean dependent: 0.05    S.D. dependent: 0.07 
(6) Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1 
LOG(FCD_SA(-1)) = 0.23*@PCY(EXR(-1))+1.18*LOG(REM_SA(-1)*EXR(-1)) 
    [3.91]    [-17.41] 
Error Correction:   
D(LOG(FCD_SA)) = -0.02*CointEq1-0.09*D(LOG(FCD_SA(-1)))+0.14*D(LOG(FCD_SA(-2))) 
    [-3.67]  [-0.76]    [1.26]     
+0.22*D(LOG(FCD_SA(-3)))+0.10*D(LOG(FCD_SA(-4)))-0.01*D(@PCY(EXR(-1))) 
[2.17]    [1.04]      [-2.97]     
+0.002*D(@PCY(EXR(-2)))-0.01*D(@PCY(EXR(-3)))-0.001*D(@PCY(EXR(-4))) 
[0.75]    [-2.51]    [-0.88]     
+0.02*D(LOG(REM_SA(-1)*EXR(-1)))-0.07*D(LOG(REM_SA(-2)*EXR(-2))) 
[0.33]      [-1.22]   
+0.04*D(LOG(REM_SA(-3)*EXR(-3)))+0.07*D(LOG(REM_SA(-4)*EXR(-4))) 
[0.56]      [1.34] 
R-squared: 0.78    Adj. R-squared: 0.65    Sum sq. resids: 0.09 
S.E. equation: 0.06    F-statistic: 6.03    Log likelihood: 79.83 
Mean dependent: 0.06    S.D. dependent: 0.10 
(7) Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1 
LOG(REV_SA(-1)*100/P_SA(-1)) = 1.24*LOG(GDP_SA(-1)*100/P_SA(-1))-4.70 
      [33.06]      [-10.05] 
Error Correction:   
D(LOG(REV_SA*100/P_SA)) = -0.71*CointEq1+0.30*D(LOG(REV_SA(-1)*100/P_SA(-1))) 
      [-6.30]  [ 2.67]       
+0.21*D(LOG(REV_SA(-2)*100/P_SA(-2)))+0.27*D(LOG(REV_SA(-3)*100/P_SA(-3))) 
[ 2.07]        [ 2.81]       
-0.94*D(LOG(GDP_SA(-1)*100/P_SA(-1)))-0.41*D(LOG(GDP_SA(-2)*100/P_SA(-2))) 
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-0.43*D(LOG(GDP_SA(-3)*100/P_SA(-3))) 
[-1.80] 
R-squared: 0.74    Adj. R-squared: 0.68    Sum sq. resids: 0.14 
S.E. equation: 0.06    F-statistic: 12.23    Log likelihood: 73.40 
Mean dependent: 0.03    S.D. dependent: 0.11 
(8) Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1 
LOG(EMP_SA(-1)) = 0.14*LOG(RWAG_SA(-1))+0.50*LOG(RGDP_SA(-1))-0.02*@TREND+0.01 
    [-2.01]    [-2.10]    [2.70]  [0.14] 
Error Correction:   
D(LOG(EMP_SA)) = -0.01*CointEq1+1.51*D(LOG(EMP_SA(-1)))-0.93*D(LOG(EMP_SA(-2))) 
    [-4.75]  [11.86]    [-4.73]     
+0.21*D(LOG(EMP_SA(-3)))+0.001*D(LOG(RWAG_SA(-1)))-0.002*D(LOG(RWAG_SA(-2))) 
[2.12]      [0.05]    [-1.56]     
-0.002*D(LOG(RWAG_SA(-3)))-0.01*D(LOG(RGDP_SA(-1)))-0.003*D(LOG(RGDP_SA(-2))) 
[-1.18]      [-2.96]    [-0.74]     
+0.0003*D(LOG(RGDP_SA(-3)))-0.0004 
[0.08]      [-1.41] 
R-squared: 0.99    Adj. R-squared: 0.98    Sum sq. resids: 0.01 
S.E. equation: 0.001    F-statistic: 269.47    Log likelihood: 285.15 
Mean dependent:-0.01    S.D. dependent: 0.01 
(9) Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1 
LOG(WAG_SA(-1))  = -0.59*LOG(UNE_SA(-1))+3.08*LOG(P_SA(-1))+0.21*LOG(PRO_SA(-1)) 
    [-2.60]      [8.94]  [1.21] 
Error Correction:   
D(LOG(WAG_SA)) = -0.13*CointEq1+0.09*D(LOG(WAG_SA(-1)))-0.05*D(LOG(WAG_SA(-2))) 
    [-1.57]    [0.89]    [-0.36]     
-0.44*D(LOG(UNE_SA(-1)))+0.46*D(LOG(UNE_SA(-2)))+0.52*D(LOG(P_SA(-1))) 
[-0.38]      [0.42]    [0.99]     
-0.56*D(LOG(P_SA(-2)))+0.07*D(LOG(PRO_SA(-1)))+0.25*D(LOG(PRO_SA(-2)))+0.05 
[-1.02]    [0.24]      [0.91]  [1.90] 
R-squared: 0.67    Adj. R-squared: 0.58    Sum sq. resids: 0.13 
S.E. equation: 0.06    F-statistic: 7.35    Log likelihood: 73.56 
Mean dependent: 0.06    S.D. dependent: 0.09 
(10) Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1 
LOG(P_SA(-1)) = 0.16*LOG(WAG_SA(-1))+0.08*LOG(EXR(-1))+0.02*LOG(OIL(-1)*EXR(-1)) 
    [-9.87]    [-5.40]  [-2.43]     
+0.10*LOG(M2_SA(-1))-0.004*@TREND+1.70   
[-2.54]    [-1.76]  [0.97] 
Error Correction:   
D(LOG(P_SA)) = -0.57*CointEq1+0.23*D(LOG(P_SA(-1)))+0.06*D(LOG(P_SA(-2))) 
    [-2.44]  [ 1.08]    [0.30]     
+0.25*D(LOG(P_SA(-3)))+0.09*D(LOG(P_SA(-4)))+0.06*D(LOG(WAG_SA(-1))) 
[1.63]    [0.64]    [1.86]     
+0.11*D(LOG(WAG_SA(-2)))+0.03*D(LOG(WAG_SA(-3)))+0.05*D(LOG(WAG_SA(-4))) 
[3.14]      [0.54]    [0.91]     
-0.01*D(LOG(EXR(-1)))+0.18*D(LOG(EXR(-2)))-0.02*D(LOG(EXR(-3)))+0.13*D(LOG(EXR(-4))) 
[-0.04]    [ 1.31]    [-0.17]    [1.02] 
+0.04*D(LOG(OIL(-1)*EXR(-1)))-0.001*D(LOG(OIL(-1)*EXR(-2))) 
[1.55]      [-0.27]     
+0.001*D(LOG(OIL(-1)*EXR(-3)))-0.001*D(LOG(OIL(-1)*EXR(-1))) 
[0.40]      [-0.41]       
+0.05*D(LOG(M2_SA(-1)))+0.03*D(LOG(M2_SA(-2)))+0.10*D(LOG(M2_SA(-3))) 
[0.77]    [0.43]    [1.59]     
+0.09*D(LOG(M2_SA(-4)))-0.06+0.001*@TREND 
[1.91]    [-3.41]  [2.45]     
R-squared: 0.82    Adj. R-squared: 0.65    Sum sq. resids: 0.01 
S.E. equation: 0.01    F-statistic: 4.85    Log likelihood: 151.97 
Mean dependent: 0.01    S.D. dependent: 0.02 
 